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Essence and Mere Necessity 
Jessica Leech, King’s College London. 
 
Abstract 
Recently, a debate has developed between those who claim that essence can be explained 
in terms of de re modality (modalists), and those who claim that de re modality can be 
explained in terms of essence (essentialists). The aim of this paper is to suggest that we 
should reassess. It is assumed that either necessity is to be accounted for in terms of 
essence, or that essence is to be accounted for in terms of necessity. I will argue that we 
should assume neither. I discuss what role these key notions – essence and necessity – can 
reasonably be thought to contribute to our understanding of the world, and argue that, given 
these roles, there is no good reason to think that we should give an account of one in terms 
of the other. I conclude: if we can adequately explain de re modality and essence at all, we 
should aim to do so separately. (153 words) 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, a debate has developed over the nature of and relation between 
necessity and essence. Participants mostly fall into two broad categories: those who 
claim that an account of essence can be given in terms of de re necessity 
(modalists), and those who claim that an account of de re necessity can be given in 
terms of essence (essentialists). Despite their differences, both sides appear to 
share the same background assumption: that one of essence and necessity is to be 
given an account in terms of the other. They differ in their view of the direction of the 
relationship between them: the modalists give an account of essence in terms of 
necessity; the essentialists give an account of necessity in terms of essence. 
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The aim of this paper is to suggest that this debate is flawed, insofar as it 
rests on this background assumption. I aim to cast doubt on both sides: that we can 
give an account of essence in terms of necessity, and vice versa. Against the 
modalists, I give something of a pessimistic summary of the existing debate, with 
some contributions of my own. Against the essentialists, I argue that there is no good 
reason to think that de re necessity and essence are intimately linked in the right 
kind of way to guarantee that all essential properties are necessary properties (which 
is required for the essentialist account to work). My aim is not to argue that some 
essential properties are contingent, but rather to show that those embroiled in these 
debates thus far have no good reason to assume that all essential properties are 
necessary. If I am right, then a sizeable proportion of recent work in metaphysics is 
trading on a notion of essence (and necessity) that is, as yet, unfounded and 
therefore potentially unfit for purpose. 
What is the upshot? If we can make good on the notions of de re modality and 
essence at all, we should aim to do so separately, at least in the first instance. In this 
paper I set aside whether or not there is a successful independent account of each 
notion, but on the assumption that there is or could be, we should not aim to explain 
one in terms of the other. 
 
2. Modality and Essence 
Before proceeding, some background. First, I should clarify the notions of essence 
and necessity under scrutiny.  
 The debate primarily concerns de re metaphysical necessity (and species 
thereof). It concerns 'essential' in the sense in which it is contrasted with 'accidental'. 
There are a variety of different things that might be counted, by one philosopher or 
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another, as essential, or essence. A demanding notion of essence is that of an 
individual essence, i.e. a property that serves to distinguish a particular individual 
across possible worlds. A more permissive notion is that of a property which is 
essential to an individual, although the property may be had by other individuals. For 
example, it is often claimed that Socrates is essentially human, but this doesn't 
prevent other things from being human (e.g. Plato). In both cases, essential 
properties are had by individuals: in the case of individual essence they are claimed 
to be necessary and sufficient, in the latter case they are only claimed to be 
necessary, for being a certain individual. Claims about essence are also made about 
natural kinds. Theoretical identities, such as 'Water is H2O', are often described as 
essentialist claims. 
In this paper I focus on essential properties of individuals. As far as possible, I 
wish to avoid debates about which properties in particular are essential, or whether 
there are any essential properties. My concern is with whether we can make sense 
of an essential property of an individual, as distinguished from a merely necessary 
property. I will work with cases of the form 'a is essentially F' in mind, such as 
‘Socrates is essentially human’ or ‘Socrates is essentially the child of Phaenarete’. I 
won’t consider cases of theoretical identities, or essences of kinds and properties. 
There will not be space to give a full treatment of such cases here, but it is an 
interesting question for elsewhere whether what I go on to claim about individuals 
and their properties can be extended. 
It is by no means a settled matter what, if any, properties are essential. 
Nevertheless, it is a useful guide to identify a class of typical cases of essence that 
should, as far as possible, be accommodated by any account of essence, as 
distinguished from cases that are intuitively not of essence. There should be the 
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flexibility to discover that some – perhaps many – typical cases are in fact not 
essential, according to an otherwise plausible and defensible account. But it would 
be difficult to know where to start without initially taking at least some cases for 
granted. Hence, I draw on typical cases from the literature on essence to guide my 
discussion. 
 A well-known and now standard introduction to the debate in question is to be 
found in Kit Fine's ‘Essence and Modality’.1 Fine targets the traditional view that an 
essential property is to be straightforwardly understood as a necessary property, a 
property had by an individual in any possible world in which that individual exists.2 
 
(Modalism1)  a is essentially F if and only if necessarily, if a exists, then a is F. 
 
His counterexamples are, by now, familiar. Necessarily, if Socrates exists, Socrates 
is a member of the singleton set of Socrates. But, intuitively, Socrates is not 
essentially a member of any set. Necessarily, Socrates and the Eiffel Tower are 
distinct. But it seems odd to suggest that the Eiffel Tower should feature in some 
way in the essence of Socrates: Socrates is not essentially distinct from the Eiffel 
Tower. Take any necessary truth, for example, that 2+2=4. Necessarily, if Socrates 
exists, then 2+2=4 – there’s no world in which Socrates exists and 2+2 does not 
equal 4, because it is true in all worlds that 2+2=4. However, it does not seem to be 
part of the essence of Socrates that 2+2=4. Finally, it is necessary that, if Socrates 
                                                          
1 Fine, K. (1994) ‘Essence and Modality’, Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and 
Language:1-16. 
2 This is one of several different formulations of modalism, but nothing much hangs 
on my choice here. 
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exists, then he exists. But Socrates doesn’t essentially exist; he was an inspirational 
philosopher, but not a God. 
In such examples, we encounter a distinction between two classes of 
necessary properties, those which are essential, and those which are merely 
necessary (had by an individual in all worlds in which the individual exists). Following 
Fine, such a distinction has been taken up into the literature. Indeed, it has become 
relatively commonplace and uncontroversial to distinguish between essence and 
mere necessity. This can be seen in the variety of attempts to honour the distinction 
between essential and merely necessary properties, whilst resisting Fine's 
conclusion that metaphysical necessity should be defined in terms of essence.3 It 
can also be seen elsewhere, for example, in work that seeks to distinguish between 
essential and necessary dependence and/or explanation,4 and in a proposal for how 
to understand intrinsic properties.5 Having accepted this distinction, a new debate 
                                                          
3 For example, Brogaard, B., & Salerno, J. (2013) ‘Remarks on counterpossibles’, 
Synthese, 190, 639–660; Correia, F. (2007) ‘(Finean) Essence and (Priorean) 
Modality’, Dialectica 61:63-84; Cowling, S. (2013) ‘The modal view of essence’, 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43:2, 248-266; Della Rocca, M. (1996) ‘Recent 
Work on Essentialism: Part 1’, Philosophical Books 37:1-13; Denby (2014) ‘Essence 
and Intrinsicality’, in Francescotti, R. (ed.) Companion to Intrinsic Properties, De 
Gruyter; Wildman, N. (2013) ‘Modality, Sparsity, and Essence’, The Philosophical 
Quarterly 63:760-782. 
4 For example, Correia, F. (2008) ‘Ontological Dependence’, Philosophy Compass 
3:1013-1032. 
5 Cameron, R. (2009) ‘Intrinsic and extrinsic properties’, in R. Le Poidevin et al (eds.), 
The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge, 265-275. 
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comes into view: that of whether we can understand essence in terms of necessity, 
or vice versa. 
 
3. Necessity First 
Fine has shown that not every necessary property is an essential property, i.e. that 
modalism1 is false.6 A definition of essence in terms only of necessary properties will 
not do. But can this definition be supplemented? Can we define essential properties 
as a sub-species of necessary properties? Several proposals have been made, and 
criticized, in the growing literature on this debate. I cannot reproduce the entire 
discussion here; rather, I summarize some significant points, and make some 
observations.  
 First, we might add a clause to rule out trivial necessary properties. A simple 
definition of a trivial property is a property that every entity whatsoever has just in 
virtue of existing (being a thing). 
 
Essentialists attempt to discover what properties are required to be a 
particular thing A. Typically the aim in so doing is to offer an account of what 
is required to be A that goes beyond the kinds of facts we can learn about A 
simply from the general fact that A is a thing. What we can learn from this 
general fact does not reveal the specific character of A and is, for that reason, 
                                                          
6 Not everyone agrees with Fine's examples, but dissatisfaction is often an overture 
to the presentation of a set of preferred examples which also serve as 
counterexamples to modalism1. See, for example, Gorman, M. (2014) ‘Essentiality 
as Foundationality’, in D. Novotný and N. Lukáš (eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives 
in Metaphysics, 119-137, Taylor and Francis.  
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trivial. Properties that are necessary to A but which stem merely from the 
general fact that A is a thing are thus called trivial necessary properties. (Della 
Rocca, 1996, 3) 
 
These properties don't tell us anything about what it is to be A in particular, but rather 
only what it is to be anything. So they aren't relevant to the peculiar nature of A in the 
way that the notion of essence requires. 
Della Rocca extends the definition of a trivial necessary property to include 
properties which are not themselves properties that can be had by everything, but 
the having of which follows logically from a thing having a universal trivial property. 
Della Rocca's example is self-identity. Socrates, like all things, is self-identical. It 
follows from Socrates's being self-identical that Socrates is identical to Socrates, and 
hence that Socrates has the property of being identical to Socrates. Nothing else can 
have this property. Nevertheless, it is trivial: the same line of reasoning will lead us to 
the claim that, for example, Plato has the property of being identical to Plato, and so 
on for all things.7 
                                                          
7 One might also worry about this example. It does not follow logically from 
something's being self-identical that it is identical to Socrates: it is only Socrates's 
being self-identical that implies that Socrates has the property of being identical to 
Socrates. As such, the entailment seems to rest on specific and non-trivial 
information concerning Socrates. However, presumably Della Rocca's point is that 
we can run the same line of reasoning for anything that exists. In each case we 
appeal to the self-identity of one particular thing rather than another. But there is no 
difference in how things go for different things. It's not as if, for example, we can't 
8 
 
The proposal is thus: 
 
(modalism2) a is essentially F if and only if necessarily, if a exists, then a is F, and 
being F is non-trivial. 
 
(triviality) being F is trivial if and only if every entity whatsoever is F just in virtue 
of existing, or, being F follows logically from being G where every entity 
whatsoever is G just in virtue of existing. 
 
Modalism2 allows us to address Fine’s counterexamples.8 For example, 
although being a member of singleton Socrates is a property only Socrates can 
have, Socrates's having this property follows from Socrates's having a property 
which is universally necessary: being a member of a singleton set. Conversely, there 
is no triviality to be found in singleton Socrates's necessarily having Socrates as a 
member. It is not the case that everything has Socrates as a member, not even sets, 
so it is not universally necessary. What universal necessity might it follow from? That 
necessarily everything has a member? This is false, even for sets (there is an empty 
set).  
However, one can generate counterexamples to modalism2.9 Take the case of 
origin. The essentialist might claim that a human has their origin essentially, i.e. they 
essentially have the parents they actually have. So, for example, Oedipus essentially 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conclude in the case of Plato that he's identical to Plato, on the basis of his being 
self-identical. 
8 See Gorman (2005). 
9 See Gorman (2005) for a different approach to generating counterexamples. 
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has Jocasta as a parent. But such cases are asymmetrical. Even though having 
Jocasta as a parent is essential to Oedipus, it is no part of what it is to be Jocasta 
that she had any children at all. So Jocasta is not essentially a parent of Oedipus. 
Now, it is necessary that, if Oedipus exists, he has Jocasta for a parent. This is non-
trivial: many things lack this property, and many things lack parents.10 So according 
to modalism2, Oedipus essentially has Jocasta for a parent. Also, it is not necessary 
that, if Jocasta exists, she has Oedipus for a child. So far so good.  
However, plausibly, Jocasta does have the following property: necessarily, if 
she exists, being a parent of Oedipus if he exists. There are worlds in which Jocasta 
exists without Oedipus, but no worlds in which Oedipus exists without Jocasta – this 
is what allows for the asymmetry in the simple cases. But, in all worlds in which they 
both exist, Oedipus is the child of Jocasta (so the essentialist of origin claims). So, 
Jocasta does have the necessary property of being a parent of Oedipus if he 
exists.11 
                                                          
10 If everything has an origin, one might claim that Oedipus's origin is trivial insofar as 
it follows from the universally necessary property of having an origin. However, we 
might not want to rule out the possibility of objects without an origin, perhaps 
everlasting or cyclical objects. 
11 There is a background assumption here that Jocasta and Oedipus are contingent 
beings, but the argument can be modified to accommodate views according to which 
everything exists necessarily, as, for example, in Williamson, T. (2002) ‘Necessary 
Existents’, in O’Hear, A. ed. Logic, Thought and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; and Zalta, E. N. (2006) ‘Essence and Modality’, Mind, 115:459, 
659-693. We need only modify examples of properties had in all (and only) worlds in 
which a thing exists, for the surrogate notion of properties had in all (and only) worlds 
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This is not obviously trivial. It specifies a property that Jocasta herself bears in 
certain circumstances, i.e. whenever Oedipus exists. However, one might respond 
that, nevertheless, Jocasta's having of the particular necessary property being a 
parent of Oedipus if he exists follows logically from her having, in virtue of being a 
thing at all, the universally necessary property being such that Oedipus is a child of 
Jocasta if they both exist. So the case counts as trivial. 
Suppose we agree. We have a ‘such that [necessary truth]’ property, which is 
trivially had by everything. However, the triviality clause was supposed to 
differentiate those properties which go 'beyond the kinds of facts we can learn about 
A simply from the general fact that A is a thing'. The necessary property of being 
such that Oedipus is the child of Jocasta if they both exist allows us to learn more 
about certain entities, namely Jocasta and Oedipus, than others. So, according to 
Della Rocca’s motivations for his account, it should not count as trivial. If it doesn't 
count as trivial, then the account allows that Jocasta is essentially a parent of 
Oedipus if he exists. But this is supposed to be false. So modalism2 should be 
rejected. 
Even if one could find a response to this, things would go no better. Again, 
suppose we accept that Jocasta is trivially necessarily a parent of Oedipus if he 
exists (if she exists), and thus not essentially so. However, this cuts both ways. 
Oedipus himself bears the (slightly different) universally necessary property of being 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in which a thing is concrete. So, for example, we might say that Jocasta and Oedipus 
exist in all worlds; necessarily, if Oedipus is concrete, he has Jocasta for a parent; in 
some worlds in which Jocasta is concrete, she does not have Oedipus as a child; but 
Jocasta does necessarily have the property of being a parent of Oedipus if he is 
concrete, if she is concrete. 
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such that Oedipus is a child of Jocasta, if Oedipus exists.12 As suggested above, this 
implies that Oedipus is only trivially necessarily a child of Jocasta if he exists. So by 
the proposed account Oedipus is not essentially a child of Jocasta. But this is 
supposed to be false. So modalism2 should be rejected. (This problem also 
generalises: most parties do not want to claim that Socrates is trivially necessarily 
human in virtue of having the universally necessary property of being such that 
Socrates is human if he exists.) 
The modalist might respond by taking issue with the suggestion that there can 
be complex properties of this kind at all, i.e. properties involving conditionals. We can 
certainly construct predicates of this complex kind, e.g, ‘is a parent of Oedipus if he 
exists’. Whether or not complex predicates such as these correspond to 
metaphysically robust entities called 'properties' is a reasonable question. At least: if 
there are complex properties of the kind described, modalism2 fails. The modalist 
may therefore wish to restrict essential properties to sparse properties.  
Unfortunately, attempts to defend the view that essential properties are 
necessary and sparse are also problematic. Skiles (2015) offers a detailed criticism. 
To briefly summarize one of the more obvious problems: however we define ‘sparse’ 
– in terms of perfectly natural properties, or in terms of those properties involved in 
the total scientific understanding of the world – there will be cases of non-sparse 
                                                          
12 This change is required because the essentiality of origin claim is not that Oedipus 
is essentially the child of Jocasta if they both exist. This would allow for Oedipus 
having a different parent in worlds in which he existed without Jocasta. The claim is 
rather that Oedipus is essentially the child of Jocasta if he exists. But this still 
generates a universal necessary truth, that necessarily, if Oedipus exists then 
Jocasta is his parent, and accordingly a universal necessary property. 
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(abundant) properties that we want to count as essential. For example, we might 
want to make claims about what is essential to an artwork, such as that the creator 
of an artwork is essential to it.13 But artworks and many of their properties will not 
count as sparse on either conception. Skiles offers further examples. 
 
Take, for instance, human artefacts such as the Eiffel Tower, which 
essentially exemplifies various abundant properties (e.g., being a tower) and 
essentially stand in abundant relations (e.g., the relation was designed and 
constructed to perform such-and-such function by, which it bears to some 
engineer or other, or perhaps to Gustave Eiffel in particular). Similarly goes for 
entities such as smiles (the essential nature of which include facts about 
faces), holes (the essential nature of which include facts about perforated 
surfaces), tropes (the essential nature of which include facts about the 
particular things they ‘inhere’ in), and events (the essential nature of which 
include facts about the objects, properties and times that ‘participate’ in them), 
among others. (Skiles 2015, 106) 
 
None of these properties seem trivial, and so would not be ruled out by modalism2. 
For example, being created by Michelangelo is certainly not a property that is had by 
all things, and (e.g. David) having this property doesn’t follow from having some 
other, universal, property. So appeal to sparseness cannot save modalism2. Again, 
modalism2 should be rejected. As should modalism3: 
                                                          
13 See Levinson, J. (1980) ‘What a Musical Work Is’, The Journal of Philosophy 77:5-
28; Wiggins, D. (2001) Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge University 
Press, 136-8. 
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(modalism3)  a is essentially F if and only if necessarily, if a exists, then a is F, and F 
is a sparse property. 
 
 Another option requires that essential properties be intrinsic.  
 
(modalism4) a is essentially F if and only if necessarily, if a exists, then a is F, and F 
is intrinsic. 
 
For example, Denby (2014) proposes such an account of essence, supported by his 
own definition of ‘intrinsic’.14 One might immediately worry that such a view cannot 
accommodate relational essences, such as singleton Socrates having Socrates as a 
member, or Socrates being the child of Phaenarete, for intrinsic properties are 
supposed to be those that concern only the thing itself, not anything to which it is 
related. Denby responds by claiming that these are non-relational, intrinsic properties 
of pairs. However, a deeper worry for modalism4 is that intrinsicality and necessity 
interact in ways that undermine the proposal.  
‘Intrinsic’ is often defined in a way that draws on modal terms. For example, in 
their classic treatment, Langton and Lewis draw on the idea that intrinsic properties 
cannot differ between duplicates.15 Denby’s alternative is developed in terms of 
compossible distributions of properties: roughly, the distribution of an intrinsic 
                                                          
14 Denby, D. (2006) ‘The Distinction between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties’, Mind, 
155:457, 1-17. 
15 Langton, R. and Lewis, D. (1998) ‘Defining “Intrinsic”’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 58:333-345. 
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property is independent of distributions of other properties, and so will be 
compossible with distributions of other properties.16 Trouble ensues when we try to 
combine modally-defined intrinsicality with necessary properties: if a property cannot 
differ at all (if it has a necessary distribution), then it cannot differ between 
duplicates, and so is intrinsic. If there is only one possible (i.e. a necessary) 
distribution of a property, then it will be compossible with all other possible 
distributions of other properties, and so the property is intrinsic. Because the notion 
of an intrinsic property is, according to these definitions, not independent of the 
necessity of a property, we should not use intrinsicality to place a further constraint 
on necessary properties in order to give an account of essential properties: the 
results will be distorted by prior interaction between intrinsicality and necessity. 
 Such debates continue.17 However, I will not discuss any further varieties of 
modalism. The current state of the literature suggests that one can continue to 
develop new conditions on necessary properties, and hence new varieties of 
modalism, but that criticism and counterexamples will not be far behind. The more 
complicated the proposals become, moreover, the less plausible they are. At some 
point, it becomes more reasonable to suppose that the modalist approach is wrong, 
than that the truth about essence lies in an increasingly complicated series of 
conditions on necessary properties.  
 
                                                          
16 This is simplifying to a great extent. I don’t want to do Denby an injustice here, by 
not properly outlining his view, but I think this brings out the core of the proposal. 
17 For example, Brogaard and Salerno (2013) propose a form of modalism that 
includes a counterfactual condition, Steward objects – Steward, S. (2015) ‘Ya 
shouldn’ta couldn’ta wouldn’ta’, Synthese, 192, 1909-1921. 
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4. Essence First 
Perhaps the modalist gets things the wrong way around: we should give an account 
of essence first, and then give an account of necessity in terms of essence.18 Fine 
draws on an understanding of essence in terms of real definition.  
 
[E]ssence has been conceived on the model of definition. ... The concept of 
essence has then taken to reside in the “real” or objectual cases of definition, 
as opposed to the “nominal” or verbal cases. (Fine 1994, 2) 
 
Aristotle famously wrote, 
 
A definition is a phrase which signifies the what-it-is-to-be. (Topics, 101b38-
102a1) 
 
A real definition, one might say, tells us what features of a thing are tied up with its 
being, its existence. The real definition of a tells us ‘what it is to be a’. To take an 
example from Aristotle: the definition of a human is that it is a rational animal. This 
not only distinguishes it from all other kinds of things, but it strikes at the core of what 
                                                          
18 See Fine (1994); Hale, B. (1996) ‘Absolute Necessities’, Nous Supplement: 
Philosophical Perspectives, 10, Metaphysics 30:93-117; Hale, B. (2002) ‘The Source 
of Necessity’, Philosophical Perspectives 16:299-319; Hale, B. (2013) Necessary 
Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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it is to be human. By contrast, a human may be sitting or not, thus the property of 
sitting is an accident.19  
 To clarify, some recent work on the notion of real definition has moved away 
from equating it with essence. For example, Fine writes, 
 
I have previously suggested that definitions, either nominal or real, might 
plausibly be taken to correspond to statements of essence (simply involving 
the reverse arrow ‘’). What I would now like to suggest is that reductive 
definitions be taken to correspond to real definitions in which the arrow can be 
reversed, so that we have what is both a constitutively necessary and a 
constitutively sufficient condition for something to hold. (2015, 308)20 
 
                                                          
19 Aristotle arguably only has in mind definitions of kinds, such as human, and not 
definitions of individuals, such as Socrates. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 15: ‘And 
so when one of the definition-mongers defines any individual, he must recognize that 
his definition may always be overthrown; for it is not possible to define such things’. 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.7.vii.html, translated by W. D. Ross. 
20 Reverse arrow signifies essence, forwards arrow signifies grounding, and so ‘’ 
signifies a relation of both grounding and essence. For example, x = H2O  x = 
water, means that it is essential to x being water that x is H2O (it is constitutively 
necessary that x be H2O to be water), and x is water in virtue of it being the case that 
x is H2O (it is constitutively sufficient for x to be water that it is H2O). Fine, K. (2015) 
‘Unified Foundations for Essence and Ground’, Journal of the American 
Philosophical Association, 296-311.  
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Rosen (2015) gives an account of real definition in terms of essence and 
grounding.21 Insofar as these accounts draw on a prior notion of essence, and do not 
intend real definition to be equivalent to essence, I set them to one side. In what 
follows, I draw on other notions that one might take to flesh out a non-modal 
understanding of essence, that one might take to be related to a notion of real 
definition. If this is confusing in light of recent work, I am happy to give up the label 
‘real definition’. The important point is working through some ways of thinking of 
essence, and whether they require that essential properties be necessary. 
The essentialist proposal is that once we have a notion of essence (along the 
lines of real definition, or something similar) we can then give an account of 
necessity in terms of essence. A basic principle is usually the following: it is 
metaphysically necessary that p just when it is true in virtue of the essential nature of 
some things that p. Such a proposal relies on the assumption that the essences of 
things are necessary to them, i.e., that if a is essentially F, then a is necessarily F. 
My main contention will be that this assumption is unfounded – insofar as we can 
make sense of a notion of essence, without drawing on a prior notion of necessity, 
essence does not entail necessity. In simple terms: what something is does not tell 
us – absent further assumptions – what something must be.  
I will not argue by counterexample, by arguing that there are cases where a is 
essentially yet merely contingently F. Rather, I argue that, insofar as we understand 
what the notion of essence is supposed to offer us, it can do that without having to 
yield necessity: necessity is not required. To this end, I discuss two different ways 
we might understand the role that essence is supposed to play: properties that are 
required for persistence and destruction conditions, and properties that are required 
                                                          
21 Rosen, G. (2015) “Real Definition”, Analytic Philosophy, 56(3): 189-209. 
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for individuation. My argument, in each case, takes the following form: (1) essential 
properties are required to play role R; (2) role R can be successfully played by 
contingent properties; therefore (3) we should not argue the following: that essential 
properties are necessary because they are required to play role R. 22 I then propose 
a diagnosis of why we might expect essence to get us to necessity, via confusion 
over transworld identification. Finally, I address an argument from utility – the 
assumption that essence yields necessity is so fruitful that we should accept it as 
true. 
 
4.1  Persistence and destruction conditions 
There are some changes that some things survive, and some they don’t. For 
example, a table can survive a change of colour (through being painted), but not a 
change from wood to ashes (through being burnt). A human being can survive 
getting a haircut, but not the cessation of all physiological functioning. What is the 
difference between the changes that things do and do not survive? 
 One proposal is that a thing only survives changes under which it retains its 
essential properties. We often appeal to the kind of thing something is to explain its 
persistence and destruction conditions. For example, it is because it is a table, and 
                                                          
22 Compare: one might argue that the role of properties is to account for similarities 
and differences. That role could be filled by transcendent universals, in which case, 
properties would be necessary existents. But there is nothing in the role identified for 
properties that requires properties to exist necessarily. It seems that contingent 
entities could play that role, e.g., immanent universals, or tropes, or concepts. 
Hence, we should not conclude, just from recognizing this role for properties, that 
properties are necessary beings. 
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not a mere collection of particles, that a table cannot survive being burnt; it is 
because they are a human being, and not a lump of flesh, that a human cannot 
survive cessation of physiological functioning. Those properties which are required 
for the continuing existence of an individual might be rightly thought of as what it is to 
be for that individual – for if those properties are lost, then that individual no longer 
is. 
We might question whether there really are properties so central to the 
existence of things. Hazlett (2010), for example, presents a compelling narrative 
about a snowball, challenging whether there are any such specifiable properties 
connected to destruction.23 One might think that a snowball couldn’t survive melting. 
But, ‘we can cook up a story in which a snowball intuitively survives being warmed: 
you land a vicious blow with a powerful snowball, I vow revenge, I melt your snowball 
and refreeze it to make it harder or more aerodynamic or something, and then I 
cathartically attack—using the very same snowball with which you attacked me’. 
(Hazlett 2010, 85) However, even granting for the sake of argument that it is correct 
to take some properties to play this role, does this imply that they are had 
necessarily? 
Suppose that Socrates cannot lose his humanity without ceasing to exist. Is 
Socrates thereby necessarily human? Why think he had to be human in the first 
place? Perhaps Socrates might have been a robot. In that case, perhaps Socrates 
could not lose his robot-ness on pain of ceasing to exist. In other words, this notion 
of essence implies that if what it is to be a is to be F, then it is impossible for a to be 
temporarily F, i.e. necessarily, if a is essentially F, a is permanently F. But that does 
                                                          
23 Hazlett, A. (2010) ‘Brutal Individuation’, in A. Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in 
Metaphysics, 72-90, Palgrave-MacMillan.  
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not imply that a is necessarily F.24 Essential properties, thus understood, are 
amongst what we might call the permanent properties. But permanence does not 
imply necessity. Indeed, there are many properties that, once had, cannot be lost, 
that we would not want to class as necessary or essential, such as the property of 
having eaten a sandwich. 
Given that not all permanent properties are necessary, what else is special 
about so-called essential properties? Why do we appeal, in particular, to Socrates's 
being human in an account of his persistence and destruction conditions? We might 
restrict ourselves to sparse properties, to rule out tensed and/or relational properties 
such as having eaten a sandwich. However, I have already noted that sparseness 
raises its own problems. (For example, it is likely that the properties providing the 
persistence conditions of an artwork, if there are such, are not sparse.) 
We might take the essential properties to be those that ground persistence 
and destruction. So, although Socrates could survive losing neither his humanity, nor 
his having met Glaucon, it is his loss of the former property that is taken to ground 
his perishing. More generally, it is distinctive of a property F that is essential to 
something a that it not being the case that a is F will ground it not being the case that 
a exists.25 However, just because a certain property actually grounds Socrates's 
perishing, it doesn't follow that the property necessarily plays that role. For example, 
if Socrates had been an antelope, it would have been the property of being an 
antelope, not that of being human, that grounded Socrates's perishing or persisting.  
One might add the assumption that the grounding relation is factive and 
necessitating: if P grounds Q, then necessarily, if P obtains, Q obtains and P 
                                                          
24 See also Kripke (1980, 144, fn 57). 
25 Thank you to an anonymous reader for this suggestion. 
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grounds Q.26 This would ensure that necessarily, if it's not the case that a is F, then 
it's not the case that a exists. So the relevant properties turn out to be necessary to 
the existence of things after all. However, this argument rests on the assumption that 
the grounding relation is factive and necessitating. But this assumption is, in a way, 
precisely what is at issue here. Let us suppose we have a reasonable grasp of the 
idea that it is Socrates's having of the property of being human that grounds whether 
Socrates persists or perishes. It is Socrates's having the property of being human 
that explains why in some circumstances Socrates persists – e.g. eating a sandwich 
– and in others he perishes – e.g. drinking hemlock. The explanation is given in 
terms of Socrates's retaining or losing the property. The question at issue is: why 
think that this explanation of how Socrates actually is expands to tell us about how 
he must be? Why think that the actual facts about grounding are necessary? For 
example, it may be that, whilst facts about when Socrates persists or perishes are 
actually grounded by his being human, he could have been non-human and a robot 
instead, in which case facts about when Socrates persists or perishes would have 
been grounded by his being a robot. To simply appeal to the assumption begs the 
question.  
If one is prepared to loosen the tie between essence and grounding, there is 
another response. Say what you like about grounding: if it is a necessitating relation, 
then we cannot explain persistence and destruction conditions in terms of grounding, 
because that would entail that the properties the having or lacking of which ground 
                                                          
26 There are also weaker versions of this claim we might consider. For example, if 
grounding is an internal relation, then if P grounds Q, then necessarily, if P and Q 
obtain, then P grounds Q. However, my objections to the stronger principle carry 
over. 
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the existence or not of a thing belong to that thing necessarily, and that, I have 
argued, is implausible. Just because Socrates happens to be a human, and so 
cannot survive ceasing to be human, it does not follow that Socrates couldn’t have 
been something else entirely in the first place. 
Perhaps these examples simply show that it is not being a human or a robot 
that provides Socrates with his persistence conditions; it must be some more general 
property. For example, Socrates is a thinker and his persistence conditions are 
grounded by his being a thinker. Supposing that thinkers can be animal or machine, 
this explains why he could have been a human or a robot. Fair enough. But we can 
introduce more extreme cases, where it becomes harder to think of a plausible, more 
general, property to ground persistence. For example, Socrates might have been a 
marble statue, and had he been, his persistence conditions would have been 
grounded in his being a statue. Is there a plausible more general property, which a 
human, a robot, and a statue could share? They are all objects, but that is too 
general to provide a meaningful persistence condition for Socrates. One cannot 
simply reply that Socrates couldn’t have been something as different as a statue – 
that is the point at issue. My claim is that the role of providing or grounding 
persistence and destruction conditions can be fulfilled by something we might call 
the ‘what it is to be’ something, without this being necessitating. In these examples, 
Socrates always has some such conditions, even if he could have been a very 
different kind of thing. 
 
4.2 Individuation of things 
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How can we identify particular individual things, and discriminate between them? It 
has been argued that this is only possible through reference to sortal concepts. 
Sortal concepts, roughly speaking, allow us to count. As Brandom puts it, 
 
Unsortalized ‘things’ or ‘objects’ cannot be counted. There is no answer to the 
question how many things there are in this room; there is one number of 
books, another of molecules, another of atoms, another of subatomic 
particles. … Counting is intelligible only with respect to a sortal concept.27 
  
Sortals, so the thought goes, allow us to think of individuals. We can only think of an 
individual as a this such, not as an individual simpliciter.28 There is some plausibility 
in the idea. How do we draw a line between one thing and another? Just pointing 
and shouting ‘That!’ is perhaps not specific enough. But, for example, if when 
pointing at something running across the field, I shout 'That rabbit!' rather than 
simply 'That!', I make it clear that I want to pick out the rabbit (the organism), not the 
un-detached rabbit parts, or an instance of swiftness. Similarly in thought: I can't just 
magic up de re thought of a particular, rather I require a sortal concept to draw 
boundaries around the individual object of thought. The sortal concept – and the 
sortal property thereby represented – provide conditions for the persistence of the 
object, and for its identity and distinctness from other things. As such, it is natural to 
think of sortal properties (or falling under sortal concepts) as being essential to their 
bearers, in the sense that they are intimately connected with the identity of those 
things. 
                                                          
27 Brandom, R. B. (1994) Making it Explicit, Harvard University Press, 438, 
28 See Wiggins (2001, 159), Brandom (1994, 439). 
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The proposed line of thought takes us from the importance of a's being F for 
individuation of a, to a's being necessarily F. The idea is that, as a's being F is so 
central to our very ability to conceive of a, a couldn't be otherwise than F. Note, the 
view that sortals are required in something like this way for singular reference is 
controversial.29 If it turns out to be wrong, then of course there can be no helpful 
route from here to essence to necessity. But I also want to argue that, even granting 
that sortals do play this kind of role in individuation, they can do so without being 
instantiated necessarily.   
First, even granting that we need sortal concepts to enable an initial grasp of 
an individual, once we have de re thought of it we can hold that fixed through a wide 
range of variations. For one, it seems highly plausible that we can track an individual 
through changes in its sortal properties over time. Fictional stories are endemic with 
such changes. For example, in The Chronicles of Narnia by C.S. Lewis many 
characters are turned from flesh to stone by the White Witch, but on her defeat, they 
turn back to flesh. Arguably, this involves cases of an individual changing from one 
sortal property (e.g. faun), to another (stone) and back (faun) over time. Or, in J.K. 
Rowling’s Harry Potter books a number of characters are able to take an animal form 
at will and can change, for example, from human, to cat, and back to human. Or we 
might return to Hazlett's snowball example, where we track an individual through 
change from snowball, to quantity of water, to iceball. We might plausibly imagine a 
human having more and more body parts replaced with mechanical prostheses (first 
                                                          
29 For example, Campbell (2006) argues that singular reference requires general 
constraints that are much weaker than sortal concepts. Campbell, J. (2006) ‘Sortals 
and the Binding Problem’, in F. MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality, 203-218, 
Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
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a metal hip, then a bionic leg, then a bionic eye, a synthetic heart, and so on). After a 
while, we are left with a robot, not a human being, but it is at least open to argument 
that the same individual has persisted throughout those changes.  
What is important about these examples is that they make sense. So the 
claim that our ability to conceive of an individual always requires us to use the same 
sortal concept for that individual doesn't fit at all with our actual abilities to track 
identities, even if we do need to use some sortal concept at each stage of tracking.  
One could again respond by claiming that such cases merely show that we 
have isolated the wrong properties as sortals. For example, in the change from 
human to robot, the individual is perhaps a person throughout, and hence it is this 
latter property that provides individuation conditions. However, again, this is less 
plausible with more extreme examples, such as Mr Tumnus changing from faun, to 
stone, to faun again. Any property that is shared by the faun and the stone, and had 
by Mr Tumnus throughout his existence, such as being an object or being self-
identical, is too general to be helpful. 
However, let us suppose that the temporal case can be made, and that sortal 
properties thereby underwrite principles of individuation: a principle that 'allows us to 
answer questions about identity and distinctness at a time and over time'.30 So, for 
example, if being human is such a property, then it provides Socrates with a principle 
of individuation. It tells us what changes he will and won't survive, and it gives criteria 
for determining when humans are the same or different. 
Again, there is no immediate reason to suppose that, just because being F 
actually provides a with a principle of individuation, a is thereby necessarily F. For 
                                                          
30 Mackie, P. (2006) How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential 
Properties, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 134. 
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example, just because the conditions under which Socrates actually survives, and 
according to which he is actually distinct from Plato, are tied to his actually being 
human, this does not mean that he could not have been non-human (with a different 
principle of individuation).31 What is required is further argument that a given 
principle of individuation corresponds to a necessary feature of an individual.32  
Mackie (2006) argues convincingly that no such argument is successful. 
Summarizing: one might claim that counterfactual possibilities for individuals have to 
be grounded in their actual characteristics. So there must be some actual 
characteristic of an individual which it has in all counterfactual possibilities for that 
individual. However, this is just bad reasoning. From, 'x has one of its actual 
properties in all of its counterfactual possibilities', it does not follow that 'there is an 
actual property of x such that x has it in all of its counterfactual possibilities'. One 
might strengthen the claim to: counterfactual possibilities for individuals have to be 
grounded in an actual characteristic that is sufficient to individuate the individual.33 
                                                          
31 Hazlett argues that if we are not committed to some necessary properties of 
individuals, then ‘nothing would or could be destroyed’ (2010, 87). However, 
suppose that Socrates has no (non-trivial) necessary properties. He is actually a 
human philosopher, but he might have been a talking donkey. That said, given that 
he is a human, if he loses that property, he will cease to exist. And had he been a 
donkey, if he lost that property, he would cease to exist. So we can allow for 
destruction without necessary properties. 
32 Further problems for this view may arise from potentially competing principles of 
individuation, as in the case of Lumpl (lump of clay) and Goliath (statue). But I have 
no space to adequately consider such issues here. 
33 See, for example, Wiggins's Anchor Constraint (Wiggins, 2001, ch. 4). 
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But why can't another, actually non-individuating, property anchor the individual? 
This won't prevent the individual from having a principle of individuation in other 
possibilities; it will just be a different one. In terms of accounting for identity, 
persistence, change and destruction, a principle of individuation can perform these 
functions whilst being connected to a contingent property. 
Again, we are surprisingly adept at tracking individuals across modal 
variations. For example, I may need to identify my neighbour's pet Bouncer through 
use of the sortal dog, but having thus identified her, I can consider meaningful 
questions about what Bouncer would have been like had she been a guinea pig, 
e.g., she might have had (and been recognisable in virtue of) the same savage 
personality, but required quantities of cucumber rather than meat. Here, the 
putatively nonessential property of a savage personality serves as our 
‘counterfactual anchor’, not the putatively essential properties of doghood or Guinea-
pig-hood. Whether or not you agree that Bouncer really could have been a guinea 
pig, I contend that the proposal above at least makes sense. It’s not unintelligible 
that Bouncer could have been a guinea pig, recognizable by virtue of her distinctive 
savagery. So it’s not right to claim that our very ability to conceive of Bouncer is 
constrained by her actual sortal property of being a dog.  
Let us start again with the claim that we need sortals to identify things, e.g. I 
can only identify a by conceiving of a as F, where F is a sortal concept. If that is 
really what a is, then how can one count as genuinely conceiving of a, if a is not 
conceived of as F? One can reply that even if one needs the sortal to identify a as 
the object of de re thought, once grasped, we can track a over a remarkable range of 
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changes – cross-temporal and cross-modal.34 I take it that our ability to identify and 
track objects across sortal changes – both over time and counterfactually – is data 
about our individuating abilities that needs to be accounted for in any theory of 
individual reference or individuation. The onus is on the proponent of the sortalist 
view to either provide such an account or to explain away the data. Either way, a 
case remains to be made that any of this shows us that essential properties, thus 
understood, are necessary. 
There may be cases where a link between essence and necessity seems 
clearer. For example, Wiggins presents an example drawing on the familiar and 
uncontroversial principle that sets are identical if and only if they have the same 
members.  
 
Suppose that we try to apply these criteria, and we are invited to think of a 
thing α simply identified as the entity ... to which there belong the items x and 
y and only these. Then it seems that, if we are to envisage for α what it is, the 
question we have to ask is whether α, the very thing α, could have dispensed 
with the particular entities x and y. If it could ... then α is not a set or a class. 
(Wiggins 2001, 119) 
 
                                                          
34 See Textor, M. (2009) “`Demonstrative’ colour concepts: recognition versus 
preservation”, Ratio, 22, 234-49, section 4, for a discussion of anaphora and 
preservative memory, which might serve as the basis for a positive account of how 
we can achieve this kind of tracking.  
29 
 
What it is for a thing to be a set implies that the thing couldn't have had different 
members. But now this looks like a case of essence yielding necessity: α essentially 
contains x and y, so α necessarily contains x and y. 
  It is significant that this is an example of a mathematical object: a set. I have 
discussed two putative roles for a notion of essence. First, to give things persistence 
and destruction conditions, and second, to provide things with individuation 
conditions, to enable identification of them over cross-temporal and cross-modal 
changes. But, on a typical understanding of the nature of mathematical objects, such 
as sets, they aren’t the kinds of things that could be destroyed, or that undergo any 
change.35 We typically think of mathematical objects as abstract, transcending space 
and time, existing necessarily, and thereby also undergoing no ‘modal change’, i.e. 
having their (genuine) properties necessarily. So, we don’t need to take some of 
these properties as fixed to explain persistence and destruction or to enable tracking 
through change. This is thus not the reason why we take, for example, the 
membership of a set to be necessary. There seems to be an antecedent 
commitment to the (genuine) properties of the set being necessary.  
My guiding question at present is: why should what it is to be a thing imply 
what a thing must be? It seems to be part of how we think about mathematical 
objects that they have their (genuine) properties necessarily. So, part of what it is to 
be a set, say, is to have its properties – including its membership – necessarily. If 
what it is to be α is to have its properties necessarily, then if α is φ, it follows pretty 
obviously that α is necessarily φ. But this gives us no general way to move from what 
something is, to what it must be. For example, it is not part of what it is to be 
                                                          
35 By which I mean genuine change, not mere Cambridge change: the number 2 can 
change from being my favourite number to no longer being my favourite number. 
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Socrates that he have all his (genuine) properties necessarily. So there is no 
comparable route from it being part of what it is to be him to be human, to his being 
necessarily human. 
 
4.3  Transworld identification 
I have argued that we are able to track individuals over changes in ways that 
suggest that sortal concepts or properties do not in general give rise to necessities. 
To say more would require a detailed account of the nature of individual thought and 
reference, which I cannot do here. I have tried to show that various ways to 
understand essence do not imply that essential properties are necessary. I want to 
offer a brief suggestion for a diagnosis of what has gone wrong. In future work, or in 
an improved recasting of the debate, this is a problem to be avoided. 
Thinking about identity can be confusing. When we talk about de re modality 
we need to be careful to distinguish good questions from bad questions. We have to 
be careful asking questions such as 
 
(1) Which thing in world w bears the identity relation to object a in the actual 
world? What is that thing like? 
 
That sounds like we're talking about two things being one, which is absurd.36 Rather, 
we should ask questions more like 
                                                          
36 A different question that isn’t absurd is: ‘which thing in world w bears the 
counterpart relation to a in @?’ Counterpart theory offers a different approach to 
understanding questions of transworld identity that potentially avoids the pitfalls 
under discussion. I won’t discuss this option in any depth here, as my main target is 
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(2) Here is a (here in the actual world). How could that thing (a) have been 
different? How could it feature in counterfactual scenarios? 
 
We don't need to find a by looking through a metaphysical telescope: the relevant 
thing is already right here (see Kripke 1980, 44). In particular, if a is F, we don't need 
to look through the telescope to find the F over there that is a. We might need some 
help, e.g. the resources of sortals, to actually identify a, but once identified, we can 
proceed with our questions. 
Question (1) above might also quickly turn into 
 
(3) How can we identify a in w? 
 
such that we need to know what a is like in w before we can know which thing it is, 
rather than the other way around – wanting to know what a is like in w, taking a's 
identity for granted. Furthermore, there is a temptation to extend this to  
 
(4) In virtue of what property or relation is x in w identical to a in the actual world? 
 
This then asks for a property that must be had by a in every world in which it exists. 
Hence, we see how one could move (illegitimately) from the perhaps plausible 
requirement that we need sortals to initiate de re thought of an individual, to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the essentialist who does not avail themselves of counterpart theory (largely 
because they want to give an account of modality in terms of essences, not in terms 
of worlds, independently understood). 
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claim that we therefore need to employ that same sortal in any thought of the same 
individual, across times and counterfactual possibilities. But we got here from 
thinking in terms of distinct things in other worlds that we need to find, rather than in 
terms of the actual thing here the possibilities for which we want to consider. 
 
4.4 Generalised identity 
In the previous section I argued that it is easy to get confused about identity in a way 
that leads to a bad conception of essence. However, there are other ways that 
thinking about identity may in fact shed light on essence. In particular, Correia (2006, 
2017) draws links between essence, identity, and real definition that might be 
thought to provide the link to necessity that I have been seeking.37 Correia takes 
statements of the form “To be F isdef to be G” to be real definitions, and statements of 
the form “To be F isid to be G” to be generalised identities (such as, “to be a water 
molecule is to be an H2O molecule”). Correia takes real definitions to be essentialist 
statements (2017, 53), and gives an account of them in terms of generalised identity 
and metaphysical priority. 
 
(RD)  To be F isdef to be G iff (i) to be F isid to be G, and (ii) being G is 
metaphysically prior to being F. (2017, 60) 
 
According to this proposal, identity is built into essence. It is hard to argue (and I am 
not willing to do so) against the necessity of identity. Hence, this gives us a more 
                                                          
37 Correia, F. (2006) “Generic Essence, Objectual Essence, and Modality”, Nous 
40(4): 753-767; (2017) “Real Definitions”, Philosophical Issues, 27, Metaphysics, 52-
73. 
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plausible route to taking the essence of a thing to be necessary to it: if to be F isdef to 
be G, then necessarily, all Fs are G. 
The question I have been exploring is: why should we need a notion of 
essence, and do essential properties need to be necessary to fulfil that need? The 
question remaining for Correia’s proposal is thus: why should we need this notion of 
essence? In particular, for the kinds of cases I have been considering, why should 
we need to ask, for example, what it is to be Socrates, where that amounts to asking 
something like: what is identical to and metaphysically prior to being Socrates? In 
brief, it seems to me that this brings us back to the same considerations already 
canvassed. We might want to know what is the same as being Socrates so that, in 
these terms, we can explain Socrates’s persistence conditions, or reidentify Socrates 
over time, and over possibilities. But, I have argued, these roles for essence do not 
require essence to be necessary, hence, they do not require an essence that is 
identical with being Socrates.38 This is not to say that an alternative answer to the 
question could not be found, but what I take to be the more obvious options are not, 
or so I have argued, sufficient. 
 
4.5  An argument from utility 
I have argued that, given some plausible ways to understand the role of essential 
properties, it does not follow, from their playing this role, that they are necessary 
properties. But there is an alternative line of argument open to the essentialist: the 
assumption that essential properties are necessary, combined with the essentialist 
account of necessity, is so theoretically fruitful that this gives us reason to believe it. 
 This approach is reminiscent of David Lewis on his plurality of worlds. 
                                                          
38 This is, in effect, a modus ponens/modus tollens move. 
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Why believe in a plurality of worlds? – Because the hypothesis is serviceable, 
and that is a reason to think that it is true. The familiar analysis of necessity as 
truth at all possible worlds was only the beginning. In the last two decades, 
philosophers have offered a great many more analyses that make reference 
to possible worlds, or to possible individuals that inhabit possible worlds. … 
What price paradise? If we want the theoretical benefits that talk of possibilia 
brings, the most straightforward way to gain honest title to them is to accept 
such talk as the literal truth. (Lewis 1986, 4) 
 
This brings me to my first response to the utility argument. There are other 
philosophical packages that offer theoretical fruits, such as a Lewisian metaphysics. 
It would be beyond the scope of this paper to adjudicate between all possible 
packages. My point is just that utility alone is not enough to support the essentialist 
view; its benefits must be detailed and shown to be preferable to those of rival 
packages. 
 This leads to a further response. The essentialist claims a bounty of 
theoretical benefits. The only way to combat that claim thoroughly is to examine (and 
challenge) those benefits in turn. This is not something that can be achieved in the 
scope of this paper, but is a long term project. At least, I hope to have shown here 
that one could reap some of the benefits of a notion of essence connected to 
persistence conditions or individuation, without being committed to essential 
properties also being necessary properties. 
 
5. Divide and conquer 
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On the one hand, we take things to have modal profiles: we think of them as being 
necessarily one way, contingently another, and merely possibly yet another. We 
therefore seek an account of de re necessity and possibility. On the other, we want 
to understand the identity, persistence, and destruction conditions for things. We 
therefore seek an account of what each thing is, in terms of something we might call 
its real definition. If we appeal to one notion – call it ‘essence’ – to provide both 
accounts, we end in confusion: either we struggle to give an adequate restriction of 
necessary properties to essential properties, or we struggle to give an account of 
real definition that can adequately explain necessary properties. Better to keep these 
two roles apart. Fine (1994) compares two different approaches to understanding 
essence: one in terms of de re modality, another in terms of real definition. He 
suggests we replace one with the other, as if they are competing notions. My 
proposal is to recognise each as a substantive notion in its own right, answering to 
its own family of issues. We may discover relations between the two, but I have 
argued that we should not begin by assuming that one is to be analysed in terms of 
the other. An investigation into the relationship between essential properties and de 
re necessities should begin with independent accounts of each notion. From there, 
we can inquire into the relationship between essence and necessity, given those 
accounts. But it is a mistake to assume too close a relationship from the outset.39 
(10048 words) 
 
                                                          
39 Thank you to audiences in Birmingham, Edinburgh, Glasgow, St. Andrews, Stirling, 
and the Royal Institute of Philosophy in London, for helpful discussion of some of the 
ideas in this paper. Thank you also to Ghislain Guigon, Nicholas Jones, Bob Stern 
and Mark Textor for comments on various incarnations of the paper. 
